evidence drawn from transition elections in autocracies from several continents, cultures, and region of the world attest. Formerly ruling parties crashed, their share of the vote plummeting from the 90-99% they used to claim in single party "elections" to as low as the single digits or low teens.
Law #4. The law of 60 percent. In democracies, it is rare for incumbents to win more than 60 percent of the vote, and it never happens twice within the same spell in office. The average maximum incumbent share of the vote across all democracies is 53%, the one variable on which there is no difference between regions. This law serves as a boundary separating all democracies from most dictatorships.
Law #5. The law of alternation or shared power. In democracies, control of the government alternates between political parties or coalitions of parties. This is because no party is capable to encompassing the totality of the values and interests of any society.
As well as presenting the data that demonstrate these patterns, I place these laws in the context of related scholarly literature, and offer possible explanations for the laws in light of it.
broad electorate from among competing political parties or candidates who are free to take their message to the public by whatever means available. This necessarily requires a political climate characterized by freedom of speech, press and assembly, and a procedure for honestly counting votes that is acceptable to the competing parties and the public. A presidential democracy is one where the executive is independently elected; a parliamentary democracy is one where the executive, a cabinet headed by a prime minister, is selected by and normally from within the legislature.
By contrast, any regime where free competition among parties to fill the legislature and executive is absent is a dictatorship or autocracy, of which there are many types. 3 Some consist of rule by the military, with or without an official political party as an adjunct (Brazil, 1964 (Brazil, -1988 Indonesia, 1971 Indonesia, -1997 Chile, 1973 Chile, -1989 . Others take the form of a dominant or sole political party (Mexico 1930s-1980s; the USSR, 1920 . Some are personalist or "monarchical," 4 where a dominant personality 3 Barbara Geddes, "What do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?," towers over the state, sometimes filling the office of president or prime minister (Cuba's Fidel Castro, 1959 -2008 Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1956 -1970 , and other times without always occupying a formal position as chief executive or head of state (the Dominican Rafael Trujillo, various years, 1938 -1961 . A number of single party or military dictatorships may be described as oligarchical, consisting of a group of more or less equal partners who take turns at wielding executive power (Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI by its Spanish initials; the military regime that ruled Brazil between the 1960s and 1980s). The one common denominator among all dictatorships is that competition among political parties to fill the policy-making offices of the state is either absent or highly restricted, so that at best a domesticated "opposition" is allowed to win a few seats in a rubber-stamp assembly that does the bidding of an executive chosen in a non-democratic process. 5 In the limit, the dictator aims at lifetime tenure, and the top ranks of the dictatorship aspire at perpetual power that can be passed on to their heirs, natural or political. Hitler's "1,000 year Reich" was only one of the more fantastic expressions of this inordinate ambition.
Regarding the data, they consist in 455 elections in 27 democracies, 15 from Ibero-America (Latin America plus Spain and Portugal) and most of the rest from North America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim (the OECD countries), plus more than 100 ritualistic "elections" and referendums in 15 dictatorships. 6 They include regimes in large and small countries that cut across different times, cultures, and ideological cast.
Thus, there is a good chance that the set is broadly representative, although more cases need to be added, especially of parliamentary democracies where mutations of parties and permutations of multi-party coalitions make it difficult for a non-specialist to make sense of certain election outcomes.
All data were obtained from Wikipedia. 7 The initial election in each democracy depends on context. I picked the earliest election for which there was voting data, the electorate was comparatively inclusive (e.g., universal male suffrage), and the outcome was relatively straightforward. In all Ibero-American cases but Chile, the start date was the first election that marked the birth of its most recent democratic regime. In parliamentary democracies the prime minister's party is generally treated as the incumbent, and it is this share of the vote that is usually used. In some cases, where a coalition of small parties managed to stick together for more than one election, as in Sweden, the coalition total was entered. A few elections were omitted from the calculations because they resulted in hung parliaments. There are a few cases of missing data, e.g., no information on turnout rate in several Indian elections. Other perplexities are present. Examples: In some parliamentary elections, it was not possible to figure 7 There may be readers who wonder about the accuracy of election results in Wikipedia.
Some assurance may be taken from a study that concluded that in the case of American state elections "A statistical analysis based on Wikipedia's reported election results would return essentially the same results as an analysis relying on official data." Adam R. Brown, "Wikipedia as a Data Source for Political Scientists: Accuracy and Completeness of Coverage," PS: Politics and Political Science, 2011, 44, 2, 339-343. out just what percent of the vote to attribute to small parties that were members of a large coalition that broke up or disintegrated even before the election. 8 In those instances, the incumbent vote, though not the outcome, was omitted. Similarly, there were cases where the incumbent had been elected as an Independent and constitutionally could not succeed himself, so that it was impossible to calculate a term loss (e.g., Chile, 1952 and 1958 , Portugal, 1991 . Note, as well, that when an election followed the adoption of a new constitution or electoral law in a former dictatorship, as in Cuba in 1940 or Spain in 1977, incumbency was regarded as vacant.
In sum, as is usually the case, there is a certain amount of "noise" or "dross" (for lack of a better word) in the data. Others may well filter it out a little differently than I did. I make no claim that the data set from which the values in tables 1-3 were calculated is completely free of errors. However, given the large number of elections, my guess is that whatever errors remain are not biased in any direction, and thus cancel each other out, although needless to say, I welcome corrections. Neither do I think that the estimated parameters are exact, and no doubt a larger data set will produce some adjustments. All that said, I turn to the laws. 8 India was a particularly difficult case to figure out after the Indian National Congress lost its dominance. In the 1990s, a multitude of parties, some of them short-lived, ephemeral alliances, hung parliaments, etc., made it very difficult to calculate the percent of the vote that one should attribute to a party or coalition. I did my best to get it right, but I assume some errors remain, and I hope other scholars well-versed about that country's politics will correct. Law #1. The law of minority rule. All governments are minority governments. 9 Few would doubt that this generalization applies to dictatorships, where a single or dominant party or organization controlled by a dictator or a small oligarchy uses force and fraud to control the state. But the rule also applies to democracies, as shown in tables 1 and 2. The average turnout is around three-fourths of the electorate, while the mean percent vote going to the governing party, the incumbents, is in the low forties. 10 These facts mean two things: first, typically more than half of those who show up at the polls-the selectorate-cast their ballots for a party other than the governing party; second, those who do back the incumbents-the winning coalition-amount to 9 In this context, the phrase "minority government" is to be understood differently from the way it is used in the study of parliamentary democracies, where it refers to parties or coalitions of parties that form a "government," that is, the executive, a prime minister and his cabinet, even though they control less than a majority of seats in parliament. Depending on whether one takes the pooled mean or the average of the within country means, across all democracies incumbents win reelection between 55% and 60% of the time, as shown in Table 2 . This is because the opposition can be badly divided; or because in parliamentary governments there is a certain disproportionality between seats and votes, and votes are wasted on parties that win no seats; 13 or because the plurality winner strikes deals with minority parties and independents on a case by case basis, or forms a "minority government" (in the parliamentary sense) for a brief period. 14 Additionally, the electorate may be somewhat biased in favor of the "devil" they To point out that democracies are characterized by minority governments ruled by parties that enjoy an electoral advantage over their competitors is not meant to belittle or to de-legitimate them. 16 That incumbents lose elections at least one third of the time-and in some places a lot more frequently than that-means that over the long run roughly two thirds of the electorate sees its preferred party or candidate win. Law #3 in dictatorships. There is no reason to believe that dictatorships are exempted from this law, notwithstanding their ambitions for perpetual power. Thus it happens that in some cases, as with the Wizard of Oz, the little dog of a demonstration that was not quashed in time starts the process of pulling the curtain of propaganda behind which the dictator and his clique manufacture images of unanimity, exposing the regime's true level of support and causing the regime unceremoniously to collapse. 21 The demise of the Soviet Union and its Central and East European satellites are cases in point. Except in Romania, the dictatorships were not violently overthrown; rather, they deflated, all energy having drained away bit by bit until there was nothing left. Through 1982, the party attributed to itself almost 90 percent of the vote in presidential elections (see Table 3 ). In 1988, as a result of an internal struggle, a faction led by Cuáhtemoc Cárdenas, the former president's son, broke away and then, with the support of other parties, pursued an independent bid. This scission reduced the PRI showing that year to an official 51%. This amounted to a reduction of 47 points from 1934.
Dividing that value by the nine intervening six-year presidential terms yields an average loss of 5.2 points per term, about the same as in Spain today. The PRI managed to hold on to the presidency that term and the next, albeit with shrinking shares of the vote, until it was voted out in 2000 with only 36%. Basing the calculation on that year's figure yields a slightly higher average point loss per term (5.6).
In Chile, General Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship sought to demonstrate popular support with three referenda or plebiscites in the space of a decade, but with decreasing success. In 1978, five years after the military coup against the government of elected president Salvador Allende, a "national consultation" was held for the purpose of asking the citizenry to endorse Pinochet's "defense of the dignity of Chile" against "international aggression," and to "reaffirm the legitimacy of the government of the Republic exclusively to direct the institutionalization process in the country." Seventy nine percent of the more than five million citizens who turned out voted in the affirmative. 23 Two years later, only 66% out of six million endorsed a new constitution drafted by his government, a drop of 13 points from the "consultation." Finally, when in 1988 Pinochet made bid for another eight years in La Moneda, the presidential palace, only 44% out of seven million voted in favor, a decrease of another 22 points. Assuming that the period between the first and the third referendum is roughly equivalent of two five-year terms, the loss of support amounts to a decline of 17.5 points per term. This is a large decrease, but hardly unique. Democracies in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, India, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and the United States all have had at least one disastrous defeat for the incumbents where their share of the vote fell by more than 15 points in a single three-or four-year term.
Indonesia supplies the third case. In 1971 General Suharto, running under the Golkar banner, declared victory in the presidential election with 63%. His last reelection was in 1997, when he claimed 75%. In the face of demonstrations and riots sparked by an economic crisis, corruption, and the killing of a handful of university demonstrators, he resigned the following year. In 1999, the former ruling party polled second in the legislative election, at 22%. Subtracting this last figure from the previous year's showing yields a reduction of 41 points, or about 8 points per term, in line with the contemporary democracies of Brazil and Chile (see Table 1 ).
Botswana offers yet another example. Despite the "free" rating by Freedom remain: the timing of the dictatorship's demise, which is unpredictable, and how it will die, with a bang, as in Romania, or with a whimper, as in Poland. 29 Law #4. The law of 60%. In democracies, it is rare for the incumbents to win more than 60% of the votes cast, and it never happens more than once within the same spell in office.
Generally, incumbents in a parliamentary system win no more than 50%; in a presidential system, 60% is the normal limit (in the first round of voting, if there is more than one). In only a handful of genuine cases in three democracies did the incumbents exceed this maximum: Barbados, 65% (1999), Colombia, 62% (2006) , and the United States, 61% (1936, 1964, 1972) . In all, these exceptions amount to 1.1% of all elections.
In fact, the average maximum incumbent share of the vote across all democracies is 29 Apropos the second question, Kalyvas has a pertinent observation: "popular action was least important to the process of [regime] breakdown where the discourse of civil society was most developed (Poland and Hungary), whereas revolutionary upheavals took place where civil society was weaker (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania)" (Kalyvas, "Decay and Breakdown, " p. 331; citations omitted) . If the relation between the strength of civil society and regime transition in Europe is part of a general pattern, then given the prostration of civil society in Cuba one can anticipate that the end of the Castroite regime will be rather turbulent. 53.5% (s.d= 5.9), the one variable where there is no difference between cultural regions. 30 Two apparent exceptions merit comment. One is the 1991 Portuguese presidential election. That year Mario Soares, an authentic democratic hero who had resisted dictatorships of the Right and the Left, and who had twice served as prime minister, won reelection with 70% of the vote. Portugal has a mixed regime, with a president that exercises limited executive powers and a strong prime minister in charge of the government. In his bid for reelection, Soares had the backing not only of his Socialist Party, but also of the principal right of center party, the PSD, and its prime minister, Anibal Cavaco Silva, in control of parliament. Without major party opposition, Soares easily trounced three minor party candidates, winning, one might say, almost by acclamation. The very next year, with Soares ineligible to run for a third consecutive term, and with the PSD fielding its own candidate, his party's successor share of the vote shrank to 54%. 31 The other apparent exception took place in the Dominican Republic in 1974, when Joaquín Balaguer was reelected with 85% in an election boycotted by the opposition. Indeed, the artificiality of Balaguer's victory was exposed at the very next election, when he was ousted with only 43%. 32 Thus, the inflated percentages in these two cases are accounted for by opposition abstention, one amicable, the other not.
This analysis suggests that the democratic credentials of any regime in which the incumbents claim to have received more than a few points in excess of 60% in any one election is suspect, and highly so if more than once within the same spell in office. Such claims need careful scrutiny before they can be accepted as a genuine democratic outcome. As the aforementioned Portuguese case illustrates, there may very well be an innocent explanation, but this has to be demonstrated. In sum, it is as if this law serves as a boundary separating all democracies from most dictatorships. 33 "Elections" under dictatorships. Table 3 Following negotiations between the dictatorship and the Solidarity movement, the 34 Friedrich, Carl J. and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. 1956 /1963 , Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1963 In "Elections under Authoritarianism," Gandhi and Lust-Okar observe that "rulers in dominant-party states are particularly likely to use all means possible to encourage high turnout and support for the ruling party . . . ." (p. 413). 36 Kalyvas observes that whenever formerly ruling parties in dictatorships face competition, "their performance is usually dismal" ("Decay and Breakdown," p. 325).
regime held a relatively free, if limited election. The "Solidarity Citizens' Committee" was allowed to compete for one-third of the mandates for the Sejm, or lower house of parliament, and for all seats in the Senate. The results were devastating for the "Polish United Workers' Party," as the communists called themselves. Solidarity swept all but 10 of the 261 Sejm slots up for grabs and all but one in the Senate. Thus, "In the first free voting . . . support for the Communists was shown to lie somewhere between three and four percent." 37 The outcome not only signaled the demise of the Polish dictatorship, it sent shock waves throughout the Soviet empire. In the next two years, one after another of the European communist regimes went bust, including the USSR itself.
Whether these dictatorships actually believed that they commanded universal electoral support is an interesting question. My guess is that they did not, that combined with censorship or outright direct control of the press and other means of communication, harassment or suppression of assemblies and organizations other than those officially sponsored, co-opting, exiling, jailing, or executing opponents, sowing spies and informers throughout the population, uprooting communities and scattering their members away from their homes, and in the bloodiest cases engaging in terror, mass murder and genocide, dictatorships stage shows of unanimity to intimidate the population, to render it dispirited, atomized, despairing of any hope of ever breaking free of the shackles of political oppression. 38 However, it is possible that the rulers of dictatorships would experience serious cognitive dissonance if they had to acknowledge that their regimes are rejected by a large majority of the electorate. So perhaps they have to believe it to justify the ruthlessness to themselves.
To date, among the dictatorships displayed in Table 3 This law is the consequence of the previous two. It is rooted in the very nature of the state and the very nature of democracy. Dictatorial illusions of unanimity notwithstanding, the fact is that the state is, as Aristotle taught long ago, a plurality. 40 The "'organic' common will," be it of a nation, Volk, class or revolution, is a "fiction." 41 The moment an electorate is free to choose among candidates and parties espousing a variety of programs, personalities, and styles of governing "the germs of a multicentered society" 42 are released and multiply. Thus, the "will of society emerges from competing parties" 43 whose principal object, apart from ruling per se, is to win sufficient votes or seats in elections, legislatures, and judicial bodies to steer government policy in the direction desired by its cadre and supporters. 44 Once in office, the law of growing opposition kicks in, inexorably eroding the size of the incumbents' coalition and, sooner or later, reducing it to minority status. Now another party or coalition gets a chance to pursue its vision of the state for a time until it, too, is overwhelmed by opposition and another change of government ensues. On average, in the democracies incumbent parties serve 2 consecutive terms in spells lasting 9 years. 45 Thus, in the long run, different combinations of fractions of the electorate take turns at being included in a 42 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (Yale University Press, 1957) , p. 430. 43 Kelsen, Essence and Value of Democracy, p. 33. 44 There probably is an intrinsic value to ruling over and beyond the perks of office, the expected rise in future income attributable to one's experience in government, and the chance to contribute to the shaping of state, economy and society according to one's vision of the good.
winning coalition, 46 with the result that policy zigs and zags incrementally, periodically crossing the center of the voter distribution from left to right and back again, 47 and the state is governed with a minimum of political coercion. Moreover, governing parties in a democracy usually pursue moderate policies. 48 elemental. All governments, certainly dictatorships but also democracies, can count on the votes of only a minority of the electorate, even if in democracies that minority represents a plurality that is much larger than the combination that supports a dictatorship. That incumbents enjoy an advantage over opposition parties and candidates, probably derived at least in part from their exploitation of state resources for partisan gain, should come as no surprise. That, notwithstanding this advantage, on average incumbents lose support from term to term, save some exceptions, usually early in their tenure in office that are offset in subsequent elections, is "one of the few obvious regularities observed in political science." 51 Finally, the results of transition elections in the former Soviet empire and elsewhere make it plain that the unanimity that dictators project domestically and internationally is a mirage. In a democracy, it almost never happens that an incumbent party wins more than a few points over 60%, and it never happens twice within the same spell in office. The conclusion is inescapable: the state is a plurality. No organic conception of the political community captures its essence, for it is subject to what might be called "the law of partials."
To describe these laws is not to explain them. One in particular is highly puzzling. 52 Why is it that the incumbents lose support while in office? 53 Is it on account 51 Budge et al., Organizing Democratic Choice, p. 255. 52 That political science proceeds by investigating puzzles is a theme in Robert O.
Keohane, "Political Science as a Vocation." PS: Political Science and Politics, 42, 2, 53 Budge et al., Organizing Democratic Choice, offers Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence," American Political Science Review, 2012, 106, 1, p. 135. 56 As McDonald and Budge put it, "a commonly observed phenomenon of democratic politics [is that of] the unbounded enthusiasm of activists after an election followed by them either because their interests or values are being threatened or because they resent being governed at all; and still others, not strongly committed to any party, may just search for something new-that is, newness in itself becomes a value to those voters.
Here is another puzzle: why is it that on average incumbents do worse at the polls in Ibero-America than in the OECD democracies? Is it because all but Portugal and Spain are presidential democracies? It is probable that presidential regimes may allow the electorate to focus its dissatisfaction or alienation more clearly against a particular person or party. Could part of the answer lie in the lower quality of governance in the region-more corruption, less observance of the rule of law, lower effectivenesscompared to that of the OECD, as World Bank Indicators suggest? 57 Perhaps the relative youth of democracy has something to do with it. 58 However, although not quite as young, democracy in Germany and Japan is of relatively recent vintage compared to others in the OECD, yet incumbents there experience modest loss rates per term, whereas Costa Rica, which is of the same age, averages a much higher loss per term than these two. Or maybe the electorates and politicians of Ibero-America are more prone to political volatility or extremism, with the latter making demagogic promises of easy solutions to problems of long standing and the former too quick to reject them when, as must inevitably happen, their unrealistic expectations are disappointed. It could well be disillusion with 'their' government in a year or two on. . . ." Elections, Parties, and Democracy, p. 180. that at least part of the answer lies in cultural differences in what used to be called "national character" after all. 59
Conclusion.
If, upon reflection, these laws appear almost natural, describing properties and patterns baked into the very nature of politics, democracy, and the state, the question then becomes, why are they not professed in every course of political science?
Economists have no inhibitions about proclaiming economic principles or laws. Even the natural sciences have not been shy about announcing the operation of laws before they were fully understood. 60 Why should political scientists not be as confident in professing laws of politics? I submit that we as a discipline have been too diffident, too
hesitant about professing what we know about our subject.
Be that as it may, I conclude with the hope that, in true Popperian fashion, others will take up the challenge to falsify these laws. Time will tell, as more cases are added to those analyzed here, whether the enlarged data set will be found to yield the basic 59 For a recent study arguing that region is a relevant variable in comparative politics, 
Notes:
In democracies that include a runoff, whether for president or, as in France, for the National Assembly, the vote entered is that of the first or only round.
(a) The "winning coalition" is the percent of the electorate that voted for the governing party, the incumbents. (b) In this article, the terms "incumbents" and "governing party" are used interchangeably. (c) In 1953 and 2013, incumbent Christian Democrats received a bump of 14 and 8 points, respectively, from their previous showing. These were unusual elections. Not only were they the first reelection of the party in the current spell in office, the former was held in the immediate post-World War II period, when the party system was being configured, and the latter occurred as the party system recovered from the fracturing that took place in the previous election. Accordingly, the median incumbent loss may well be a more valid measure in Germany's case, so it is shown in parentheses along with the mean. In presidential democracies that include a runoff, as well as in French legislative elections, the vote entered is that of the first or only round. (a) All democracies listed in B and C plus India , Barbados (1951 ), and Belize (1984 . (b) Australia (1901 ), Canada (1872 -2011 ), France (presidential, 1965 , France (legislative, 1958 ), Germany (1949 ), Japan (1958 ), New Zealand (1914 -2011 ), Sweden (1932 , United Kingdom (1922 Kingdom ( -2010 , United States (1828-2012). 
